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I'm assuming you want to make sure you have an "emergency admin" access, even if your actual administrator screws up (but other than that, you trust the main administrator fully).

A popular approach (although very hackish) is to have a second user with uid=0, commonly named toor (root backwards). It has a different password, and can serve as a backup access. To add, you'll likely need to edit /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow/ (copy the root lines).

It's all but fail-safe, but if you just need to safeguard against the "main administrator" changing the password without notice, then it will work. It's trivial to disable, by removing the toor account; so the solvesole benefit is having a separate password.

Alternatively, you may want to look into alternate authentication mechanisms, i.e. ssh keys, libnss-extrausers, LDAP etc.

Note that the admin can still screw up badly. For example, by blocking the firewall.

If you want to have a very secure system, consider using SELinux, where the unix user (e.g. root) is also coming with a role, which can be much more fine grained. You may want to give your admin root access, but only a restricted role (e.g. to administrate apache only). But this will require quite a lot of effort on your side to correctly configure the policy right.

I'm assuming you want to make sure you have an "emergency admin" access, even if your actual administrator screws up (but other than that, you trust the main administrator fully).

A popular approach (although very hackish) is to have a second user with uid=0, commonly named toor (root backwards). It has a different password, and can serve as a backup access. To add, you'll likely need to edit /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow/ (copy the root lines).

It's all but fail-safe, but if you just need to safeguard against the "main administrator" changing the password without notice, then it will work. It's trivial to disable, by removing the toor account; so the solve benefit is having a separate password.

Alternatively, you may want to look into alternate authentication mechanisms, i.e. ssh keys, libnss-extrausers, LDAP etc.

Note that the admin can still screw up badly. For example, by blocking the firewall.

If you want to have a very secure system, consider using SELinux, where the unix user (e.g. root) is also coming with a role, which can be much more fine grained. You may want to give your admin root access, but only a restricted role (e.g. to administrate apache only). But this will require quite a lot of effort on your side to configure policy right.

I'm assuming you want to make sure you have an "emergency admin" access, even if your actual administrator screws up (but other than that, you trust the main administrator fully).

A popular approach (although very hackish) is to have a second user with uid=0, commonly named toor (root backwards). It has a different password, and can serve as a backup access. To add, you'll likely need to edit /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow (copy the root lines).

It's all but fail-safe, but if you just need to safeguard against the "main administrator" changing the password without notice, then it will work. It's trivial to disable, by removing the toor account; so the sole benefit is having a separate password.

Alternatively, you may want to look into alternate authentication mechanisms, i.e. ssh keys, libnss-extrausers, LDAP etc.

Note that the admin can still screw up badly. For example, by blocking the firewall.

If you want to have a very secure system, consider using SELinux, where the unix user (e.g. root) is also coming with a role, which can be much more fine grained. You may want to give your admin root access, but only a restricted role (e.g. to administrate apache only). But this will require quite a lot of effort on your side to correctly configure the policy.

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I'm assuming you want to make sure you have an "emergency admin" access, even if your actual administrator screws up (but other than that, you trust the main administrator fully).

A popular approach (although very hackish) is to have a second user with uid=0, commonly named toor (root backwards). It has a different password, and can serve as a backup access. To add, you'll likely need to edit /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow/ (copy the root lines).

It's all but fail-safe, but if you just need to safeguard against the "main administrator" changing the password without notice, then it will work. It's trivial to disable, by removing the toor account; so the solve benefit is having a separate password.

Alternatively, you may want to look into alternate authentication mechanisms, i.e. ssh keys, libnss-extrausers, LDAP etc.

Note that the admin can still screw up badly. For example, by blocking the firewall.

If you want to have a very secure system, consider using SELinux, where the unix user (e.g. root) is also coming with a role, which can be much more fine grained. You may want to give your admin root access, but only a restricted role (e.g. to administrate apache only). But this will require quite a lot of effort on your side to configure policy right.