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Really happy to see this work we put together with @article19org colleagues out in the world today. As we approach the anniversary of Iran's November 2019 protests, it's more important than ever to ensure Iran #LetsTheNetWork. A 
below of my highlights of this lengthy report.https://twitter.com/article19org/status/1313756694724456455 …
Today, 
in 
Access full resources in English and Farsi at: https://article19.org/TTN-iran-november-shutdown/ …
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pic.twitter.com/W1EtYiLxBv
2: We managed to get anotice from Iran’s Communication Regulatory Authority (CRA) to ISPs ordering a phased reconnection of different institutions, and excluding areas where protests continued. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/yokQPF3dfi
3: There was no "off switch" to disconnect. There was coordination across major ISPs to cut off their users. The reconnection process similarly followed direct orders, and were based on economic priority, and level of unrest in the cities and regions.https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …
4: Even with the role of the National Information Network (NIN) becoming central to the 2019 Shutdowns, Iranian authorities still remain vague about what it means.https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …
5: We map out some recent statements and bills that are encouraging the development of the NIN, and what this means for the future of global connectivity in Iran. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/JWZkJq4qZT
6: Of course, no discussion of Iran's NIN can go without a mention of the role of US sanctions in encouraging the balkanisation of Iran's Internet. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/zU1o3iFWFZ
7. We also look at some infrastructural changes that occurred on the Iranian network since November 2019. The Major finding is a kind of "decentralisation" of access international gateways. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/Os08JHojtv
8: The "centralisation" of Iran's international infrastructure previously meant that gateways to international traffic relied on two government controlled entities (the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company and the Institute for Fundamental Sciences). https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/6Af8NRvNXK
9: Now we discovered private ISPs have the ability to directly connect (or peer) with international connections. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/fbuso0dhtD
10: This is a good sign for the fact that it proves Iran is adapting to high demand for international traffic and was likely unable to serve this demand strictly through government controlled gateways.https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …
11: This is likely a good indicator Iran is unlikely to shift towards a wholesale block on global connectivity. However, this is not a good sign for access to the Internet and the likelihood of shutdowns in the face of protests in the future.https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …
12: The private ISPs are forced to follow the strict orders of central state authorities. Even in the case of direct peering with international connections, Iran's CRA closely monitors and require the use of Lawful Intercept devices for all their connections and traffic.
13: And often times these ISPs are direct proxies of the state, known as the slang term "Khoosoolati", a play on the word private and government in Persian (Khoosoosi + dolati).
14: While the report devotes time to infrastructure, ultimately what is the most important are the power structures that are responsible for ordering shutdowns or Internet filtering decisions. We mapped out the institutions involved in this process. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/uorkvWFuMH
15: Ultimately there has been much ambiguity over who exactly was behind the shutdown. The decision has been associated with the National Security Council (headed by Rouhani's Minister of Interior). https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/wftiGr81Nu
16: a sub-branch of the Supreme National Security Council (thought to be controlled by Supreme Leader). The Rouhani administration has sought to distance themselves from the unpopular decision to shutdown. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/jqagO931Hg
17: There is very little form of accountability or transparency over the institution or entity that should be held responsible. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/4lzAycLdsV
18: While the confusion and lack of transparency in these decision making processes might seem like an error in our understanding of the processes within Iran's decision making processes, ultimately, they are a characteristic feature of governance. https://www.article19.org/ttn-iran-november-shutdown/ …pic.twitter.com/hrFeyeWvFi
Thank you for bearing through this long thread, and all my typos and errors! For more information please watch this animation we created: https://vimeo.com/458501391
And read this @WiredUK report by @mattburgess1 featuring yours truly, @Ammir and @FelAnthoniohttps://www.wired.co.uk/article/iran-news-internet-shutdown …
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